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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this breach of contract suit, the District Court found 
that the defendant, a German guarantor, had sufficient 
contacts with Pennsylvania to be subject to personal 
jurisdiction. After a jury determination, the Court also 
found that the defendant was not entitled to invoke the 
arbitration clause in the underlying contract signed by its 
subsidiary. We will affirm these rulings. The Court also 
enjoined the defendant from applying to the English courts 
to enforce the alleged right to arbitration. We will reverse 
the grant of that injunction principally on the grounds of 
comity. 
 
In June 1993, plaintiff General Electric, a New York 
corporation with manufacturing facilities in western 
Pennsylvania, entered into a contract with Moteren-Werke 
Mannheim AG, a German corporation with headquarters in 
Mannheim, Germany. Essentially, the agreement provided 
that Moteren-Werke would design, and General Electric 
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would manufacture, high horsepower diesel engines for 
locomotives. The contract also included a section in which 
Deutz AG,1 the parent company of Moteren-Werke, 
guaranteed the obligations of its subsidiary. 
 
By late 1997, the joint venture was encountering 
difficulties, and General Electric eventually called upon 
Deutz to provide the additional funding necessary for the 
work to continue. The parties held extended discussions, 
but were unable to resolve their differences. In December 
1998, General Electric filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
asserting breach of contract claims against Deutz. The 
complaint sought damages as a result of lost sales and 
diversion of resources toward tasks that were the 
contractual responsibility of Moteren-Werke. 
 
Deutz moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
or, alternatively, to compel international arbitration as it 
alleged the contract required. In July 1999, while these 
matters were proceeding in the District Court, Deutz sought 
arbitration before a panel of the International Arbitration 
Association in London. 
 
The District Court issued an Opinion and Order on 
December 29, 1999, holding that Deutz's contacts with the 
forum state, made in the course of pre-contract 
negotiations and post-contract visits by Deutz executives in 
an effort to resolve the parties' dispute, provided sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. The 
Court also ruled that the language of the contract did not 
unambiguously include Deutz within the scope of its 
arbitration provisions. The issue was submitted to a jury, 
which found that Deutz was not entitled to arbitration. 
 
In April 2000, before the arbitration panel issued a 
decision, Deutz petitioned the High Court in London to 
enjoin General Electric from further proceedings in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania. The High Court declined 
to issue an injunction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the time the contract was signed, Deutz was known as Klockner- 
Humboldt-Deutz. It was the latter entity, often referred to as "KHD," that 
actually signed the contract. For convenience, we will refer to the 
company throughout this Opinion as "Deutz," the name it later assumed. 
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On July 31, 2000, the District Court enjoined Deutz from 
resorting to the High Court in the future. It was not until 
November 14, 2000, that the arbitration Panel held that 
General Electric and Deutz had not agreed to arbitrate their 
contractual disputes. Deutz has appealed all of the orders 




We first address our appellate jurisdiction. Generally 
speaking, an order finding personal jurisdiction is 
interlocutory and non-appealable. In this case, however, we 
have jurisdiction over the appeal from the injunction. 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). Interlocutory orders that are 
"inextricably bound" to an injunction may also be 
considered in the same appeal. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 
670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); see also 
Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2001) 
("When we have jurisdiction to review an order relating to 
an injunction under S 1292(a)(1), our jurisdiction extends to 
matters inextricably linked to the appealable order."). 
 
The order finding personal jurisdiction is essential to the 
validity of the injunction in this case. If jurisdiction does 
not exist, then the District Court necessarily lacked the 
power to issue the injunction. Accordingly, the personal 
jurisdiction matter is properly before us. 
 
The ruling finding the arbitration clause inapplicable to 
Deutz is appealable under 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(1). Again, there 
is an unmistakable overlap of issues between the injunction 
and the legitimacy of the order denying arbitration. We 
therefore have appellate jurisdiction over the orders 






Due process shields persons from the judgments of a 
forum with which they have established no substantial ties 
or relationship. In order to be subject to personal 
jurisdiction, a defendant's conduct in connection with the 
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forum state must be such that he may "reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there." World-wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 
Once it is challenged, the burden rests upon the plaintiff 
to establish personal jurisdiction. Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, 
Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). 
A nexus between the defendant, the forum and the 
litigation is the essential foundation of in personam 
jurisdiction. 
 
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A 
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction when it has 
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state. 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 
408, 414-16 (1984). 
 
Specific jurisdiction is established when a non-resident 
defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at a 
resident of the forum and the injury arises from or is 
related to those activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); see also Dollar Sav. Bank v. First 
Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(discussing personal jurisdiction). 
 
Questions of specific jurisdiction are properly tied to the 
particular claims asserted. In contract cases, courts should 
inquire whether the defendant's contacts with the forum 
were instrumental in either the formation of the contract or 
its breach. Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 
Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999). Parties who "reach 
out beyond [their] state and create continuing relationships 
and obligations with citizens of another state" are subject to 
the regulations of their activity in that undertaking. Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quotations omitted). Courts are not 
reluctant to find personal jurisdiction in such instances. 
"[M]odern transportation and communications have made it 
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself 
in a State where he engages in economic activity . .. ." Id. 
at 474. 
 
Specific jurisdiction frequently depends on physical 
contacts with the forum. Actual presence during pre- 
contractual negotiations, performance, and resolution of 
post-contract difficulties is generally factored into the 
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jurisdictional determination. Remick v. Manfredy , 238 F.3d 
248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001); Farino, 960 F.2d at 1223-24. In 
modern commercial business arrangements, however, 
communication by electronic facilities, rather than physical 
presence, is the rule. Where these types of long-term 
relationships have been established, actual territorial 
presence becomes less determinative. Burger King , 471 U.S. 
at 476. 
 
It is not significant that one or the other party initiated 
the relationship. Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 
F.2d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 1992). In the commercial milieu, the 
intention to establish a common venture extending over a 
substantial period of time is a more important 
consideration. 
 
The record here demonstrates both physical contacts and 
a deliberate assumption of long-term obligations. In 1993, 
when it began negotiations with General Electric, Moteren- 
Werke was one of several subsidiaries of Deutz. Both 
companies retained the same law firm in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania to represent their interests. After Moteren- 
Werke had reached an agreement with General Electric on 
most of the contract's terms, the document was reviewed by 
Dr. Gunther Wagner, Executive Vice-President of Deutz and 
a member of its Board of Directors. 
 
Moteren-Werke began performing its contractual 
obligations in Pennsylvania shortly after the agreement was 
signed on June 15, 1993. The following year, Dr. Wagner, 
who was not only a Deutz executive but also a member of 
the Moteren-Werke management board responsible for its 
engine business, met with General Electric officials in 
Pennsylvania. The parties addressed Deutz's financial 
stability as well as other matters related to performance of 
the contract. 
 
In 1996, Anton Schneider, Chairman of Deutz's Executive 
Board, joined Moteren-Werke officials in a tour of General 
Electric's Erie and Grove City, Pennsylvania facilities. At 
that time, he discussed with General Electric officials such 
matters as the development status of the engines and the 
level of resources required to complete the venture. 
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In mid-1996, Deutz moved to curtail its subsidiaries' 
losses and reduce the number of Moteren-Werke employees 
on the General Electric project. The following year, the 
parties held a conference in Erie, Pennsylvania; in 
attendance were Peter Stark, a member of Deutz's 
management board and chairman of the management 
board of Moteren-Werke, three other Moteren-Werke 
employees, and several General Electric officials. Stark 
promised that Deutz would supply additional resources for 
the project. He returned to Erie in February 1998 to 
determine if a new engine was ready for marketing. 
 
In mid-April 1998, Deutz announced its intention to 
completely take over the Moteren-Werke business. Dr. 
Leopold Mikulic, a vice president of Deutz, traveled to Erie 
on three separate occasions in June and July of 1998 for 
meetings with General Electric representatives. Deutz's 
Chairman Schneider accompanied him on the last of these 
occasions. Neither these sessions nor extensive 
correspondence enabled the companies to resolve their 
dispute. Accordingly, on December 22, 1998, General 
Electric filed suit in the District Court against Deutz alone, 
alleging that it and Moteren-Werke had breached the  
contract.2 
 
Deutz's motion for dismissal contended that the Court 
lacked personal jurisdiction because the Deutz officials who 
came from Germany were acting solely on behalf of 
Moteren-Werke and did not represent its parent company. 
The District Court rejected that contention, and we do not 
find fault with its conclusion. The record reveals that Deutz 
failed to keep its presence or interests separate from those 
of Moteren-Werke. Deutz's financial status, a matter critical 
to its obligations as guarantor, was a frequent subject at 
the conferences held by the companies. Deutz's continued 
requests for additional financial contributions from General 
Electric were likewise intimately related to the guarantor's 
liability. 
 
The Deutz and Moteren-Werke entities made little effort 
to maintain their independence. The overlapping and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Moteren-Werke was not named as a defendant, presumably because it 
was bound by the arbitration clause in the contract. 
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interlocking committees and officials came close to creating 
a de facto alter ego arrangement.3  The visits by Deutz 
officials were not casual or fortuitous events, but serious 
efforts aimed at furthering the joint commercial enterprise. 
Deutz's status as a guarantor was not merely incidental, 
but was an important, perhaps indispensable, ingredient of 
the project, and the stakes were not minimal. 
 
In sum, the behavior of Deutz and its officials clearly 
amounts to "purposeful direction" of business activity 
toward General Electric, a Pennsylvania resident. It is also 
beyond dispute that this suit arose out of Deutz's 
contractual endeavors. Finally, Pennsylvania's assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over Deutz is neither unfair nor 
unreasonable. 
 
Unquestionably, it is less convenient for a German 
corporation to litigate in Pennsylvania, but Deutz had 
actively overseen the performance of the contract in that 
state for five years with no apparent difficulties in 
communication or travel. Given that the contract was 
performed primarily in Pennsylvania, General Electric has 
an obvious interest in conducting this litigation there. 
Deutz, moreover, has failed to present any persuasive 
reason why the matter should not proceed in that forum. 
See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 
(1950) (discussing state's interest that contractual 
obligations be observed). 
 
Thus, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
determined that Deutz's activities adequately supported a 
finding of specific jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. On January 27, 1999, some months after General Electric filed this 
suit, Deutz purchased all of Moteren-Werke's assets and obligations 
under the 1993 agreement. As the District Court observed, that 
transaction did not affect Deutz's purported arbitration rights vis-a-vis 
General Electric. 
 





THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
 
As its alternate challenge to the District Court's 
jurisdiction, Deutz insisted that as guarantor, it and 
General Electric were bound by the terms of the arbitration 
provisions in the Moteren-Werke contract. Deutz contended 
that the question of arbitrability was one for the arbiters to 
decide in the first instance. Because the arbitration clause 
did not clearly and unmistakably provide for arbitral 
determination of jurisdiction, however, the Court ruled that 
it must resolve the issue. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986) 
("It is the court's duty to interpret the agreement and to 
determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate 
grievances . . . ."). As events developed, Deutz ultimately 
did obtain a decision by the arbitration panel on 
jurisdiction, though it was adverse. Be that as it may, we 
are not relieved of our responsibility to review the District 
Court's ruling. 
 
The contract is titled "Commercial Agreement dated June 
15th, 1993 between Moteren-Werke Mannheim AG and 
General Electric Company," indicating that the Agreement 
was between those two entities. Those companies initialed 
every page of the Agreement; Deutz did not. 
 
Section 7.01 provides that "[a]ll disputes, controversies, 
and claims directly or indirectly arising out of or in relation 
to this Agreement" shall be submitted to arbitration. 
Elsewhere in Article 7, which establishes arbitration 
procedures, the contract states that General Electric and 
Moteren-Werke would nominate the arbiters and that 
General Electric and Moteren-Werke agree to certain 
conditions. Deutz is not mentioned in that section. 
 
Deutz signed the contract in a separate signature block, 
specifying that it was a party "for purposes of the 
obligations set forth in Section 9.08 hereof and Sections 
4.05, 4.06, and 4.07 hereof." Section 9.08 contains the 
guaranty, and Sections 4.05 through 4.07 require the 
parties and their affiliates to maintain the confidentiality of 
design and other information. Section 9.04, the only other 
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portion of the agreement that mentions Deutz, provides 
that a copy of any notice to Moteren-Werke should also be 
sent to its parent company. 
 
General Electric argued that Deutz had only agreed to be 
bound to the specific portions of the contract listed in the 
signature block, and had not expressly or impliedly adopted 
the arbitration clause. Deutz responded that although it 
limited its participation to specific portions of the 
agreement, the framework of that document, including 
such provisions as notice, governing law, and dispute 
resolution, was intended to be part of its commitment. 
 
Applying the forum's conflicts of laws doctrine, the 
District Court concluded that Pennsylvania law should 
govern because that state had the greatest interest in the 
outcome of the dispute. That forum was the site of most of 
the contract's performance, as well as the location of much 
of the pre-contract negotiations. Although the arbitration 
clause called for the application of Swiss law, that provision 
applied to the arbitration proceeding, not to the initial 
determination of whether there had been an agreement on 
who would decide arbitrability. In any event, there did not 
appear to be any substantial difference between 
Pennsylvania and Swiss law in this respect. 
 
After giving due consideration to the language of the 
contract and the parties' conflicting interpretations, the 
Court concluded that the arbitration clause was 
ambiguous. Accordingly, the matter was submitted to a 
jury as permitted by the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 
U.S.C. S 4. After two days of testimony from both parties' 
negotiators, the jury returned a special verdict, finding that 
General Electric and Deutz had not agreed to arbitrate their 
disputes. 
 
Deutz now contests the District Court's determination 
that the arbitration clause was ambiguous. Having reviewed 
the contractual language, however, we are not persuaded 
that the District Court's ruling was erroneous. In finding 
that the contentions of both parties were reasonable, the 
Court took an even-handed view of the dispute that cannot, 
we conclude, fairly be criticized. 
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Deutz points to landmark Supreme Court decisions in 
support of its position that federal policy favors arbitration 
for the resolution of international commercial disputes, see 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 631 (1985), and that "any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Although we agree that 
providing for dispute resolution in a neutral forum by an 
acknowledged competent agency is highly desirable, the 
matter does not end there. A court may only compel a party 
to arbitrate where that party has entered into a written 
agreement to do so. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., No. 00-3550, 
2001 WL 1229797, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 2001) (quotations 
omitted). 
 
The United States Courts certainly recognize 
international arbitration agreements. Our nation, like the 
United Kingdom, Germany and scores of other countries, 
has adopted the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
("The New York Convention"), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, reprinted in 9 U.S.C. S 201 note. 
The Federal Arbitration Act implements the United States' 
accession to the Convention, see 9 U.S.C.SS 201-08, and 
provides that it "shall be enforced in United States courts 
. . . ." Id. S 201. The arbitration clause in the instant case 
falls within the ambit of the Convention and the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
 
As the Supreme Court observed in Scherk v. Alberto- 
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974), the goal of the 
Convention is to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial contracts and to unify the 
standards by which arbitration agreements are observed. 
We have commented that "[t]he policy of the Convention is 
best served by an approach which leads to upholding 
agreements to arbitrate." Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia 
Francese di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazoni v. Lauro , 712 
F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
Federal law applies to the interpretation of arbitration 
agreements. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20; Becker Autoradio 
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 
(3d Cir. 1978). If the parties have stipulated that certain 
disputes will be submitted to arbitration and that the law 
of a particular jurisdiction will govern the controversy, 
federal courts will enforce that agreement. Becker 
Autoradio, 585 F.2d at 43. 
 
Thus, "whether a particular dispute is within the class of 
those disputes governed by the arbitration and choice of 
law clause is a matter of federal law." Id . The court decides 
the arbitrability of a dispute. Id. at 44 n.10. Although the 
issue of ambiguity per se is one of law, resolution of the 
uncertainty is one for the fact-finder. See Ram Constr. Co. 
v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
In general, then, federal rather than state law governs 
international arbitration agreements. It appears, however, 
that there is a limited exception to this rule where the 
question is whether the controversy is arbitrable. 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that if the arbitration 
agreement does not provide that the question of 
arbitrability vel non is to be decided by the arbitrators, then 
a court determines the issue. First Options of Chicago, Inc. 
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-47 (1995). In so doing, a 
court should apply ordinary state law principles governing 
contract formation. Id. at 944. "Courts should not assume 
that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there 
is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so." Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). On the contrary,"the law 
treats silence or ambiguity about the question who 
(primarily) should decide arbitrability differently from the 
way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question 
whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable 
. . . ." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
In these situations, the law reverses the ordinary 
presumption of arbitrability. Id. at 944-45. This approach 
reflects a reluctance to "force unwilling parties to arbitrate 
a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge . . . 
would decide." Id. at 945. 
 
We recognize that First Options is a domestic arbitration 
case, but the international nature of the present litigation 
does not affect the application of First Options ' principles. 
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In any event, the question of whether federal or state law 
applies is not a determinative factor at this point. Neither 
party urges the application of federal law to the 
interpretation of the agreement; they have limited their 
choices to either Swiss or Pennsylvania law. In general, we 
respect the choice of law that parties agree upon to resolve 
their private disputes. See Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A. v. 
Clover, 195 F.3d 161, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 19 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. S 4514, at 135 (2d ed. Supp. 2001) ("[T]he 
law ordinarily allows parties to a contract to structure their 
affairs by choosing to have their contract governed by the 
body of law that best suits their needs . . . ."). In addition, 
we doubt that the application of federal law would change 
the outcome of this litigation in any significant respect. 
 
Deutz further contends that the special verdict slip given 
to the jurors misled them by asking whether General 
Electric and Deutz "both agreed to arbitrate difficulties with 
each other." Deutz's only objection to this language at trial 
was aimed at the use of the word "both;" as its attorney 
stated, "[w]e have two people, they either agreed or didn't 
agree . . . . [the word "both" is] not necessary." We find no 
reversible error in the text of the verdict slip. 
 
Deutz also asks us to find that the evidence indicating an 
agreement to arbitrate was so overwhelmingly favorable to 
it that we should grant judgment in its favor on this point. 
We are not persuaded that the record supports Deutz's 
optimistic evaluation of the strength of its case, nor that we 
should reverse the jury's factual finding. "[J]ury verdicts 
can be overturned only if the record fails to contain the 
minimum quantum of evidence from which the jury could 
have rationally reached a verdict." Dutton v. Wolpoff & 
Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
In sum, we find no error in the District Court's resolution 
on the issue of arbitrability. Moreover, although not 
controlling on us or the District Court, it is interesting that 
the ICC Panel, applying Swiss law, also held that Deutz was 
not entitled to arbitration. Focusing first on the provisions 
listed in Deutz's signature block and the fact that the 
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article establishing arbitration procedures did not mention 
Deutz, the Panel found the contract ambiguous. 
 
Swiss law required the Panel to look to the parties' pre- 
contract history and other relevant circumstances. After 
considering Deutz's active participation in the negotiations, 
its refusal to add a reference to Article 7 in the signature 
block in spite of the attention this portion of the contract 
received during the final two weeks of negotiations, and the 
fact that all parties were assisted by lawyers, the Panel held 
that there was no arbitration agreement between Deutz and 
General Electric. It also observed that the outcome would 
not have been different had it adhered to one of the other 
possibly applicable national laws. 
 
We also note in passing Deutz's contention that it is 
inconsistent to suggest that the company approached the 
status of Moteren-Werke's "alter ego" for the purposes of 
personal jurisdiction, but not in connection with the 
arbitration clause. This argument confuses two very 
different issues, the terms of the contract and Deutz's 
presence in Pennsylvania. 
 
The fact that many Moteren-Werke officials were also 
high-ranking officers of Deutz is relevant to the personal 
jurisdiction analysis because the personal contacts these 
officials had with the forum state were made on behalf of 
both the parent company and its subsidiary. It is not the 
alter ego arrangement that gave the District Court personal 
jurisdiction over Deutz. Rather, it is the fact that Deutz 
officials -- in their own capacity as well as in that of 
managers of Moteren-Werke -- made frequent contact with 
General Electric in Pennsylvania for the purpose of 
discussing issues pertaining to Deutz's obligations under 
the contract. 
 
On the other hand, the contract text distinguishes the 
obligations of Moteren-Werke and its parent company. The 
interrelationship of the Deutz and Moteren-Werke officers 
simply does not alter their contractual arrangement and the 
obligations to which each company agreed.4  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that in certain circumstances, some Courts of Appeals have 
applied the principle of equitable estoppel to permit non-signatories to 
 







As noted earlier, while the parties were litigating in 
Pennsylvania, Deutz initiated an arbitration proceeding 
before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of 
Arbitration in July 1999. Despite General Electric's 
objections, the ICC assembled a panel of arbitrators to 
consider the jurisdictional issue. 
 
After the ICC Panel set a schedule for its proceedings, 
Deutz applied to the Queen's Bench Division of the High 
Court in London for an order restraining General Electric 
from seeking an injunction in the District Court in 
Pennsylvania against Deutz proceeding before the ICC. 
 
Justice Thomas of the High Court, in a judgment dated 
April 14, 2000, dismissed the request. He emphasized that 
in the posture of the matter before the Court that he was 
"not in any way finally deciding the point." Nonetheless, it 
appeared that "the words by which Deutz became a party to 
the agreement [did] not establish a serious issue to be tried 
on the question of whether [it] became a party to the 
arbitration clause." 
 
The High Court also recognized that each party had been 
given a full opportunity to produce evidence in the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
enforce arbitration agreements against signatories to various contracts. 
See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 
753 
(11th Cir. 1993); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 
863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988); Hughes Masonry Co., Inc. v. Greater Clark 
County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981). But see Grigson, 
210 F.3d at 531-40 (Dennis, J., dissenting). This Court has noted that 
line of cases, although their reasoning was factually inapplicable to the 
case before us. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber 
& Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., No. 00-3550, 2001 WL 1229797 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 15, 2001). Deutz, however, did not raise the theory of equitable 
estoppel in the District Court or on appeal, and we therefore do not 
consider whether we would apply that doctrine in this case. See First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Dayhoff Inc. v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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Court, which had applied principles similar to those 
adhered to by the Queen's Bench. Finally, Justice Thomas 
remarked that Deutz would be able to assert its contentions 
in the forthcoming District Court proceedings, particularly 
the argument that comity should inform the deference to be 
accorded the jurisdiction of the ICC Panel. In the meantime, 
the ICC Panel continued to receive memorials and expert 
opinions from the parties bearing on the jurisdictional 
question. 
 
After argument and further briefing, the District Court, 
citing its authority to enjoin parties from pursuing parallel 
litigation in foreign as well as domestic courts, issued an 
order on July 31, 2000, "permanently enjoin[ing] Deutz 
from appealing the forthcoming jurisdictional order of the 
Arbitral Tribunal to the English courts or from taking any 
other action in furtherance of its prosecution of the ICC 
arbitration." Because the parties had purportedly completed 
their submissions to the arbitration panel, and nothing 
remained but the issuance of a decision, the Court limited 
its order, enjoining Deutz from appealing the ICC ruling to 
the English courts or taking further steps in arbitration 
thereafter. 
 
The District Court acknowledged that its injunctive power 
must be exercised sparingly; parallel proceedings are 
ordinarily permitted to proceed simultaneously, at least 
until one has reached the stage where its ruling becomes 
res judicata. Recognizing that an intercircuit split has 
developed over the degree of deference owed foreign courts, 
the District Court concluded that the better approach 
emphasizes international comity. Using this standard, it 
would issue an injunction only if res judicata  applied, or if 
the foreign proceeding threatened the Court's jurisdiction 
over the matter at hand or a strong public policy of the 
United States. 
 
The District Court first considered whether its February 
28, 2000 order incorporating the jury verdict that found the 
dispute non-arbitrable was sufficiently final to serve as the 
basis of res judicata. Relying on Towers, Perrin, Forster & 
Crosby, Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1984), the 
Court concluded that: "[O]ur order is clearly final and 
conclusive in the sense that the issue will not be relitigated 
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in this Court during the proceedings on the merits of [ ] 
General Electric's breach of contract claim." 
 
Even if this were not the case, the Court concluded in the 
alternative that the ICC proceeding posed a threat to its 
jurisdiction, reasoning that "if the Tribunal were to decide 
that the parties did agree to arbitrate, it would in effect be 
declaring that it had jurisdiction and this Court does not." 
Finally, the Court found that preserving the sanctity of the 
jury verdict was an important public policy of the United 
States, and was made vulnerable by a potential ICC finding 
that the case belonged in arbitration. 
 
We are persuaded that none of the bases relied upon by 
the District Court supports the issuance of an injunction in 
this case, and will discuss each of them in turn. 
 
First, res judicata or claim preclusion 5 is designed to 
avoid piecemeal litigation of claims arising from the same 
events. The determination of whether two suits are based 
on the same cause of action turns on the essential 
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various 
legal claims. Generally speaking, claim preclusion or res 
judicata requires a final judgment on the merits in a prior 
suit involving the same parties or their privies, and a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. 
Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999); 
see also Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(describing generally the principles of res judicata). The 
party seeking to take advantage of claim preclusion has the 
burden of establishing it. United States v. Athlone Indus., 
Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Courts and commentators have used varying terminology, often 
referred to collectively as "res judicata," in discussing the preclusive 
effects of prior adjudication. Today, however, res judicata is sometimes 
used to represent two distinct preclusion concepts,"issue preclusion" 
and "claim preclusion." While the former refers to the effect of a 
judgment in foreclosing further adjudication of a matter actually decided, 
claim preclusion prohibits litigants from pursuing a matter that has not 
previously been litigated but which should have been advanced in an 
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Res judicata is commonly, and properly, pleaded as an 
affirmative defense in a second suit arising out of the same 
injury. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 189. Only in aggravated 
circumstances may the court presiding over the first case 
anticipate the second by entering an injunction against 
initiation of further proceedings; the tendency to issue such 
injunctions should almost always be avoided. The judicial 
consensus is ably summarized by Wright and Miller in their 
treatise: 
 
       "However tempting it may be for a court to conclude 
       that it is in the best position to assess the preclusive 
       effects of its own judgments, application of preclusion 
       principles requires familiarity not only with the first 
       judgment but also with the subsequent proceedings. 
       The first court should not lightly usurp the jurisdiction 
       of another court to dispose of pending litigation." 
 
18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. S 4405, at 41-42 (1981). 
 
In the case before us, only the interlocutory orders 
finding personal jurisdiction and dismissing Deutz's 
arbitration request have been entered. General Electric's 
claims against Deutz for damages have not been resolved. 
Although the order denying arbitration was appealable, see 
9 U.S.C. S 16(a); 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), Deutz had not yet 
taken an appeal at the time the District Court entered its 
injunction. 
 
In Towers, defendants appealed the California trial 
court's dismissal of their petition to compel arbitration. 723 
F.2d at 346. Before the appeal was decided, they filed suit 
in federal court in Pennsylvania, seeking an order 
compelling arbitration over the same dispute. While the 
federal action was pending, the California appellate court 
affirmed the order denying arbitration. Despite that ruling, 
the federal district court granted the petition for arbitration 
and stayed the California proceedings. Id. at 346-47. 
 
We reversed the district court's order, observing that 
under California law, the arbitration issue could be 
considered separately from the merits and that the state 
appellate court had affirmed the ruling of non-arbitrability. 
In those circumstances, the California order was res 
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judicata. Accordingly, we barred the federal district court 
from proceeding further. Id. at 348-50; see also Moses H. 
Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 10 (stay of later-filed federal 
suit pending resolution of state suit precluded further 
litigation in federal forum; state court's judgment would, 
therefore, be res judicata). Our Court explicitly declined to 
discuss the controlling rule where a federal court issues the 
prior order. Towers, 732 F.2d at 350 n.2. 
 
Although the Towers case is generally cited for the 
proposition that a state court's order denying arbitration 
may be treated as final for res judicata purposes, it is not 
irrelevant that the order had already been affirmed on 
appeal when the District Court came to a contrary 
conclusion. One reason we found the California trial court's 
order to be sufficiently final was that it was "free from 
attack on appeal. The determination of non-arbitrability 
[was] upheld on direct appeal and could not be reviewed 
again on appeal from a determination of the merits of the 
dispute." Id. at 349 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
Furthermore, even if Towers supports a finding of res 
judicata in this case, it does not necessarily follow that an 
injunction should issue. In that case, we reviewed an order 
denying arbitration entered by a trial court in another 
system. Here, on the other hand, the District Court relied 
on its own order, as yet unappealed, to preclude litigation 
in another forum. 
 
"Anticipatory" injunctions, issued before the subsequent 
suit is under way, are to be used in the rarest of 
circumstances on the domestic front. In view of the 
international reach of the injunction, the District Court 
should have left the res judicata effect of its order to the 
determination of the other forum. The District Court's 
determination that its order was sufficient for res judicata 
purposes would not necessarily be binding on English 
courts. 
 
The circumstances here were not so aggravated as to 
justify interference with the jurisdiction of the courts of 
another sovereign state, and there is no indication that the 
English courts would have prevented General Electric from 
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arguing the res judicata effect of the February 28, 2000 
order. 
 
General Electric argues that if Deutz had not been so 
restrained, it might have destroyed the District Court's 
jurisdiction by securing an order from the High Court 
compelling arbitration. The record, however, reveals little 
basis for such qualms. Deutz petitioned the High Court two 
months after the District Court had dismissed the 
arbitration request, and the High Court declined to issue an 
injunction restraining General Electric from proceeding in 
the federal court, voicing serious doubts about the strength 
of Deutz's position. Thus, the District Court knew before it 
enjoined Deutz that the High Court had shown no 
inclination to disagree with the non-arbitrability ruling. 
 
Similarly ill-founded is General Electric's assertion that 
the sanctity of the jury verdict would be jeopardized by 
permitting Deutz to repair once again to the High Court in 
London. Although the jury unquestionably has a more 
important role in the American jurisprudential system than 
in that of any other nation, its verdict is neither infallible 
nor immune from judicial scrutiny. 
 
We have been cited to no authority that endorses 
enjoining proceedings in a foreign court on the grounds 
that an American jury verdict might be called into question. 
Indeed, in denying Deutz's application, the High Court took 
pains to mention that the findings of fact had been made by 
a jury. There is little reason to believe that the High Court 
would give any less deference to the jury's role as fact- 






In parallel litigation, the issue of comity is an important 
and omnipresent factor. Although it is a consideration in 
federal and state litigation, it assumes even more 
significance in international proceedings. The Supreme 
Court has described comity as "the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive 
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or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both 
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 
(1895); see also Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing 
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (describing 
comity as a rule of "practice, convenience, and 
expediency"). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has described 
comity as a "complex and elusive concept," the deference a 
domestic court should pay to the actions of a foreign 
government, not otherwise binding on the forum. Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The primary reason for 
giving effect to the rulings of foreign tribunals is 
that such recognition factors international cooperation and 
encourages reciprocity. Thus, comity promotes 
predictability and stability in legal expectations, two critical 
components of successful international commercial 
enterprises. It also encourages the rule of law, which is 
especially important because as trade expands across 
international borders, the necessity for cooperation among 
nations increases as well. Id. 
 
The Supreme Court has taken to task American courts 
that have demonstrated unduly narrow attitudes in this 
area: 
 
       "The expansion of American business and industry will 
       hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn 
       contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all 
       disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
       courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in 
       world markets and international waters on our terms, 
       governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." 
 
THE BREMEN v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 
In another case emphasizing world economic 
interdependence, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
noted that the proper exercise of comity demonstrates 
confidence in the foreign court's ability to adjudicate a 
dispute fairly and efficiently. Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992). Failure to 
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accord such deference invites similar disrespect for our 
judicial proceedings. Reciprocity and cooperation are 
worthy goals of comity. Id. 
 
The federal Courts of Appeals have not established a 
uniform rule for determining when injunctions on foreign 
litigation are justified. Two standards, it appears, have 
developed. Courts following the "liberal" or"lax" standard 
will issue an injunction where policy in the enjoining forum 
is frustrated, the foreign proceeding would be vexatious or 
would threaten a domestic court's in rem or quasi in rem 
jurisdiction or other equitable considerations, and finally, 
where allowing the foreign proceedings to continue would 
result in delay. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits generally apply this standard.6 
 
By contrast, the Second, Sixth and District of Columbia 
Circuits use a more restrictive approach, rarely permitting 
injunctions against foreign proceedings.7  These courts 
approve enjoining foreign parallel proceedings only to 
protect jurisdiction or an important public policy. 
Vexatiousness and inconvenience to the parties carry far 
less weight. 
 
Our Court is among those that resort to the more 
restrictive standard. In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea 
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d 
Cir. 1981), we reversed the grant of an injunction against 
parties seeking to initiate parallel litigation in the United 
Kingdom and concluded that parallel in personam  actions 
should be allowed to proceed in foreign as well as domestic 
cases. Id. The fact that the District Court in that case found 
the English proceeding would be harassing and vexatious 
was not enough to justify an injunction. Id. 
 
We took a similarly restrictive approach in Republic of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626-28 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th 
Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 652 
F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
7. See Gau Shan Co., 956 F.2d at 1354-59; China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. 
M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker Airways, 731 
F.2d at 937-45. 
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Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65 (3d 
Cir. 1995). There, the Philippine government filed suit as 
plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey. During the litigation, that government was 
alleged to have taken punitive measures against its own 
citizens who had testified adversely to it in the proceedings. 
The District Court enjoined the Philippine government from 
engaging in this harassment. 43 F.3d at 67-71. 
 
Despite the aggravated nature of that government's 
alleged action, we reversed the grant of an injunction. 
Conceding that the District Court had the power to enjoin 
the Philippine government as it did, we concluded that the 
remedy was, nevertheless, extraordinarily intrusive into the 
activities of a government within its own territory and 
involving its own citizens. Id. at 80-81. The injunction 
violated fundamental notions of comity and, accordingly, it 
was vacated. Id. at 74-81; see also Remington Rand Corp.- 
Del. v. Bus. Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1272-74 (3d Cir. 
1987) (order imposing constructive trust on bankrupt 
Dutch corporation's assets wherever located substantially 
impaired bankruptcy trustee's ability to perform duties 
under Dutch bankruptcy law, thereby offending principles 
of comity); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 
F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979) ("When foreign nations are 
involved, . . . it is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign 
policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power 
are considerations that should have a bearing on the 
decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction."). 
 
Our jurisprudence thus reflects a serious concern for 
comity. This Court may properly be aligned with those that 
have adopted a strict approach when injunctive relief 
against foreign judicial proceedings is sought. Although it 
recognized our adherence to that restrictive standard, the 
District Court in this case invoked the threat to jurisdiction 
and violation of public policy factors to justify the 
injunction. As we noted earlier, the evidence supporting 
application of these factors was extremely weak, and any 
doubts to the contrary should have been put to rest by the 
High Court's judgment, issued before the injunction was 
granted. 
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The High Court's Justice Thomas commented with 
respect to General Electric's request for an injunction, then 
pending in the District Court: 
 
       "He [the district judge] will no doubt take into account 
       . . . that he, as a judge of the United States Court, is 
       being asked to exercise extraordinary extra-territorial 
       jurisdiction over an arbitral tribunal sitting in London 
       within the jurisdiction of this Court. He will no doubt 
       pay high regard to issues of comity, just as this Court 
       has paid high regard to issues of comity in relation to 
       the decisions made by him." 
 
High Ct. Op. at 26. 
 
At another point in his judgment, concluding that there 
was no serious issue of arbitrability, Justice Thomas 
observed, "It seems to me very difficult to see on what basis 
this Court should intervene in a proceeding so far advanced 
in the United States, where that particular issue has 
already been determined against Deutz." Id . at 30. 
 
Assuming arguendo that the District Court's order 
denying arbitration can constitute a ruling that is final for 
res judicata purposes before its disposition on appeal, it 
does not follow that there is a sufficient basis for enjoining 
the proceedings in the English courts. This is not an 
aggravated case that calls for extraordinary intervention, 
nor is it sufficient that the ruling of the arbitral panel might 
have jeopardized the District Court's jurisdiction. 
 
We do, of course, have a considerable advantage over the 
District Court, because the ICC Panel has now agreed that 
the case was not arbitrable. Although that decision colors 
our ruling, it does not weaken our conclusion, arrived at 
independently, that the District Court lacked sufficient 
grounds to grant the injunction. We are also confident that 
there was no serious threat to an important public policy 
because of the happenstance that essential fact finding in 
the District Court was performed by a jury rather than by 
the judge. 
 
The Order granting the injunction will be reversed. In all 
other respects, we will affirm the Orders of the District 
Court. 
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